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Leigh West* The Employer's Intentional Tort -
Should it be Recognized
in Canadian Jurisdictions?
"The bottom line of this case is that prohibiting an employee from suing
his or her employer for intentional tortious injury would allow a
corporation to "cost-out" an investment decision to kill workers. This
abdication of employer responsibility, as represented by the dissenters, is
an affront to the dignity of every single working man and working woman
in Ohio."
Frank Celebreeze, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio'
I. Introduction
At the inception of Canadian worker compensation legislation, an
historic trade off agreement was made between employers and their
workers. By virtue of this agreement, the right of workers to sue their
employer in tort was removed and in return workers were to receive
swift, certain, but limited, compensation payments for job-related injuries
and illness, regardless of fault. With a few minor exceptions2, this
agreement made worker compensation the exclusive remedy available to
an injured worker. It also lodged with the various provincial worker
compensation boards the responsibility to adjudicate whether or not the
injury or illness claimed was one covered by worker compensation
legislation.3 For the most part this statutory bar to tort action works to the
benefit of both employers and employees to preserve the integrity and
efficiency of the system. However, there is one glaring exception to the
fairness of the exclusive remedy provision. This exception results from the
*Leigh West, Associate Professor of Law, University of Windsor.
1. In Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals., 433 N.E.2d 572 at 579.
2. In Nova Scotia, for example, the statutory bar does not apply to a claim against a person
in a motor vehicle case if the accident happened as a result of the driving of a motor vehicle
that is registered or is required to be registered under the Motor Vehicle AcL For a case in point
see Chase v. Cleary et aL (1980), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 652. For a comprehensive overview of the
various provincial statutes and their exceptions see Ison, T. Workers Compensation in Canada,
(Butterworths: 1983) 101-105. For an in-depth review of the exceptions in the Ontario worker
compensation legislation see Dee, McCombie, Newhouse. Workers Compensation in Ontario
(Butterworths: 1987) 115-139.
3. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Worker Compensation Boards to determine the issue of
whether the action is barred is either explicit in the Act or is found to be conferred in the
general section of the Acts which provide that the Board determine all issues of law and fact
arising under the Act. See Mack Trucks v. Forget, [1974] SCR 788, 791. For a detailed
account of the various provincial provisions see Ison, Supra note 2 at 124.
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fact that worker compensation legislation may be, and appears to have
been, interpreted to oust legitimate action taken by an employee against
an employer, whose intentional and wilful misconduct injures the
employee. It is this inequity, insofar as it shields employers from tort
liability for their intentional misconduct, which is the subject of this
paper.
A statutory bar restricting the right of a worker to sue in cases of
intentional employer misconduct, can be legitimately challenged as
inequitable. Such a bar is not only manifestly unjust, but runs counter to
the underlying goal of worker compensation schemes to provide
employers with the incentive to make significant expenditures to improve
and maintain the health and safety conditions in their respective
workplaces. The costs of industrial accidents and illness, like other
business costs, are expected to be internalized by industry as part of the
cost of the production of goods and services. The exclusive remedy
provision; however, has been interpreted, and in some provinces
legislated, to cover and immunize employers who have acted with wilful,
wanton and reckless disregard for the health and safety of their workers. 4
The scope of the exclusive remedy provision has been stretched to the
limit to include intentional injuries attributable to the employer. On the
other hand, workers whose injuries can be attributed solely to their own
serious and wilful misconduct are not covered by the Acts and may,
under some circumstances, lose their entitlement to compensation
benefits.5
In traditional tort law, a person who commits an intentional tort is
subject to punitive or exemplary damages. The worker compensation
bargain, based on a mandatory no-fault collective liability insurance
principle, would appear to suspend employer liability not only for their
negligent and grossly negligent acts, but also for acts which are tortious
and would otherwise attract a civil suit and the possibility, at least, of
punitive damages. It is argued here that legislatures presumably did not
intend and could not countenance an interpretation which would result
in the immunization of employers from tort damages for their intentional
wrongdoing. It is the contention of this paper that an employer's
intentional misconduct should not be statutorily barred, but should be
recognized legislatively and should be considered to fall outside the
worker compensation bargain.
4. See, for example, the Ontario Worker Compensation Act s. l(l)(a)(i) which defines an
accident to include "a wilful and intentional act, not being the act of the worker."
5. In the various jurisdictions the workers claim is barred if the injury resulted from
misconduct unless the injury resulted in death or some form of serious and/or permanent
disability. For the various provincial provisions see Ison, supra note 2 at 41.
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The purpose of the paper is to set out sound reasons why an exception
should be recognized for an intentional tort. The American experience in
limiting the scope of the exclusive remedy will be reviewed. The ongoing
struggle of the U.S. state courts and legislatures to craft appropriate tests
to determine when the employer's conduct will reach a level of
culpability, sufficient to avoid the exclusive remedy, will be examined
and evaluated in a Canadian context. Finally, it will be argued that
certain instances of serious employer misconduct, which are now
legitimately sheltered by the provincial Acts, should be addressed by
amending worker compensation statutes to provide for punitive or
exemplary damages for the injured worker.
II. The American Experience
A number of U.S. state courts have held that the exclusive remedy
provision does not bar an employee from suing an employer upon a
claim of intentional tort.6 However, early attempts to bring intentional
tort actions to avoid worker compensation legislation were almost always
unsuccessful since a very narrow interpretation of intent prevailed in the
American courts. Up until the late 1970's, the notion of an intentional
tort, while recognized in theory, was not of any practical use to an injured
worker unless he or she was actually the victim of a direct assault and
battery administered by the employer in person. Courts limited recovery
to the so-called "true intentional tort" standard which required that an
injured worker prove that the employer truly intended the injury as well
as the act. Some courts also required that the employer have a specific
intent to injure a particular worker.7 Given the severity of the proof
required, it is not surprising that the intentional tort exception languished.
Recently, however, American courts have increasingly been expressing
dissatisfaction with the exclusive remedy provision in cases where there
is serious employer misconduct.8 There is a growing willingness on the
part of some courts and state legislatures to expand the definition of
intentional misconduct in order to hold liable employers who wilfully,
6. See ABA National Institute on Workers' Compensation A Review of Costs, Emerging
Developments and Remedies 1986 See in particular Herrold, "Challenging the exclusivity of
the workers' compensation remedy-The Ohio experience", where the author states that a
majority of courts recognize the exception p. 138.
7. For a general discussion of the traditional treatment of intentional torts see Notes,
"Workers' Compensation: Expanding the Intentional Tort Exception to Include Wilful,
Wanton and Reckless Employer Misconduct", 58 Notre Dame Law Rev.890 at 895-896.
8. For the most recent case see Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W. 2d.
882 (1986) and see generally Ghiardi, "Intentional Acts - An Exception to the Exclusivity
of Workers' Compensation" (1986), 37 Fed'n Ins. 7 Corp. Couns. Q. 149.
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wantonly, and recklessly expose their employees to injury and
occupational illness.9 The increased reliance on the more liberal
"substantial certainty" test to determine what constitutes an intentional
tort has enhanced the availability of the exception in cases of severe
employer intentional misconduct. There is, however, no agreement
among the states on the definition of "intentional" conduct. A number of
the states still rely on the "specific intent to injure" standard of proof and
in some states the substantial certainty standard is given a very restrictive
interpretation. t0 This has meant that an employer in some states may
knowingly permit dangerous working conditions to exist," may
knowingly violate safety and health regulations, 2 and may knowingly
withhold information or mislead workers about hazards in the
workplace 3 and still be shielded from liability and tort damages by the
exclusive remedy rule. Nevertheless, the possibility of a successful claim
in intentional tort exists and the expansion of the scope of the intentional
tort is gradually underway.
III. The American Legislative Response
In response to the willingness of the American judiciary to create a more
flexible definition of intentional tort, many state legislatures enacted new
provisions to cover employer misconduct. A variety of approaches have
9. See also In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 ESupp. 1229 (1981); Pleasant v.
Johnson 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E. 2d 244 (1985); Blankenship v. Milacron Chemicals, 69 Ohio
St.2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982); Heskett v. Fisher Laundry and Cleaners, 217 Ark. 350,
230 S.W. 2d 28 (1950); Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 491 A2d 368 (1985); Boek
v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W.233 (1930); Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
508 FSupp. 313, 316 (E.D. Me.) (1981); Readinger v. GottschalL 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191
A2d 694 (1963).
10. In particular, Texas has given the substantial certainty test a very strict interpretation, see
Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W. 2d. 404 at 406, (1985). The court in Reed held that an
employer's failure to provide a safe working environment was not intentional misconduct
unless substantially certain injury will result. However, in a more recent Texas case, Rodriquez
v. Naylor Indus., 751 S.W. 2d 701, Levin J. registered a strong dissent. He argued that intent
could be inferred from conduct which led to foreseeable injuries. He also reasoned that public
policy required that the value of human life must prevail over the financial considerations
involved in spreading the cost of business.
11. See e.g. Penton v. Southern Shipbldg., 667 F 2d 500(5th Cir. 1982); Houston v. Bechtel
Assocs., 522 F Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1981); Provo v. Bunker Hill Co., 393 F Supp. 778 (Idaho
1975); Kerrigan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., NW. 2d 578 (Iowa 1973).
12. See e.g. Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 E Supp. 549 (D.S.D. 1983); Brown v.
R.S. & Sons Painting, 680 F2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1982); Cortez v. Hooker Chent & Plastics Corp.
402 So. 2d 249 (La.Ct. App., 1981); Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 252 A. 2d 646
(Pa. 1969). See also Amchan, "Callous Disregard for Employee Safety: The Exclusivity of the
Workers" Compensation Remedy Against Employers (1983), 34 Lab.L. J 683.
13. See e.g. Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales, 508 F Supp 313 (D. Me. 1981); Williams v.
International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 810,(1982).
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been taken by the various American states. Some state statutes have
provisions allowing workers to sue in tort in addition to receiving worker
compensation benefits from employers whose wilful misconduct
allegedly brought about the injuries.14 Other states permit workers a
cause of action for intentional torts in lieu of compensation. 5 In addition,
a number of states provide for punitive or exemplary damages in cases
where employer misconduct rises above mere negligence. 16 The extra
penalties awarded against employers who breach safety and health
provisions both compensate the worker and provide an incentive for
providing a safer workplace. However, given the heavy burden of proof
on the injured worker required by some states, these provisions have not
been frequently utilized. Nevertheless, in the case of a truly egregious
employer act, they are available and may provide the measure of justice
required to preserve the integrity of the act and to balance off the rights
of workers and employers under the worker compensation agreement.
IV. The American Caselaw
The first case to advance the intentional tort exception was Mandolidis v.
Elkins Industries, Inc.,7 a decision of the Supreme Court of West
Virginia. In the Mandolidis case, the plaintiff was injured while working
with a table saw which had no safety guard. Evidence indicated that the
employer had ignored several OSHA citations to install protective guards
and that other employees had been fired for refusing to work with
unguarded saws. The court held that the wilful, wanton and reckless
misconduct of an employer constituted "deliberate intent" and thereby
fell outside the exclusive remedy rule. The court stated that, "Liability
will require a strong probability that harm may result". 18 This broad
14. See Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation (1982); For states allowing damage
suits in addition to worker compensation benefits see e.g. CaL Lab. Code 1 3602 (West Supp.
1985); Or. Rev. Stat ) 656.156 (Supp. 1983); Wash Rev. Code Ann. 1 51.24.020 (Supp.
1985); W Va. Code I 23-4-2(b) (Supp.)
15. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. StaL }23-1022 (Supp. 1984); Idaho Code 172-209 (1973); Ky. Rev.
Stat 1342.610(4) (1983); La Rev. Stat Ann. 1 23.1032 (West Supp. 1985); Md Ann. Code
art. 101, }44 (1979); NJ. Stat Ann 1 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann
162-3-2 (1978).
16. See e.g. Cal Lab. Code & 4553 (West 1971 & Supp 1982) (Increased penalty award for
serious and wilful misconduct of employer). A number of other states penalize employers who
violate a statute or regulation by increasing compensation to injured workers by 10% to 15%.
See e.g. Ark. StatAnn & 81-1310(d) (1976 & Supp.1981); Ky. Rev. Stat &342.165 (1979);
Mo. Ann. Stat &287.120(4) (Vernon 1965 & Supp.1983) N.M. Stat Ann. 52.-1-10 (1978)
NC. Gen Stat 97-12 (1979); Utah Code Ann. 35-1-12 (1953); Wis. Stat Ann. 102-57 (West
1973); Ohio Const art.I, 35.
17. 246 S.E. 2d 907 (W.Va. 1978) Mandolidis involved three cases combined on appeal.
18. ld, at 914.
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proposition led to a number of large jury verdicts in West Virginia 9 and
subsequently the West Virginia Legislature amended its Code20 and
limited the holding.2" Nevertheless, the Mandolidis court advanced a very
liberal and persuasive non-accidental injury theory which has been
favourably received by a number of labour commentators in the U.S.22
A second case involved the very problematic class of case in which
workers are exposed to toxic substances in their workplace and charge
that their employers intentionally misrepresented dangers and/or had
intentionally suppressed information about the effect of exposure. A
recurring line of these cases had previously been unsuccessful as courts
held that worker compensation was the exclusive remedy available. The
first exception to the traditional rule was made in 1980 in the Supreme
Court of California case of Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra
Costa Superior Court 23 The plaintiff, Rudkin, developed pneumonoco-
niosis, lung cancer and asbestosis after being exposed to asbestos over a
29 year period. Rudkin charged that his employer had known since 1924
of the dangers of asbestos, but had wilfully concealed and intentionally
misrepresented the hazards to him. Rudkin further alleged that even after
he had contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma (a lung cancer positively
linked to asbestos), the employer failed to inform him of the causal
connection linking his disease to the workplace. The court held that the
exclusive remedy provision barred the tort action for the initial injury but
allowed a cause of action against the employer for the aggravation of the
disease caused by the employer's fraudulent concealment of information
with respect to disease causation. The "aggravation doctrine" or "dual
injury principle" articulated by the California Court suggests that a tort
action will only lie if deliberate conduct by the employer aggravated the
original injury. Therefore, in all but the most extreme cases, the exclusive
remedy provision will apply.24 There was a breakthrough, however, in
19. See generally Note, "In Wake of Mandolidis: A Case Study of Recent Trials Brought
Under the Mandolidis Theory" (1982), 84 W. Va. L. Rev. 893.
20. See W.Va. Code $ 23-4-2 (1985).
21. The Code explicitly provides that gross negligence or wilful, wanton, or reckless
misconduct does not constitute "deliberate intention."
22. See Folks, "Workmen's Compensation: Employer Misconduct and the Exclusive
Remedy" (1979), 32 Okla LRev. 704; Amchan, "Callous Disregard for Employee Safety: The
Exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Remedy Against Employers" (1983), 34 Lab. L.J
683; Marlow, "Exclusive Remedy Provisions in the Workers' Compensation System:
Unwarranted Immunity For Employers' Wilful and Wanton Misconduct" (1985), 31 South
Dakota L.Rev. 157; Hale, C., Workers' Compensation-A Proposal To Protect Injured
Workers From Employers' Shield Of Liability" (1989), 20 St. Mary's L J.
23. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 (1960).
24. The Johns-Manville reasoning was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Millison
v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. A-1 (N.J. 1985), which held that the fraudulent
concealment of already developed diseases is outside worker compensation law.
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that the court recognized and stated with some conviction, that
compensation legislation should not serve as shield for blatant employer
misconduct. More importantly, as a result of this case, the California
legislature codified and expanded the intentional tort exception into
law. 25 The door was opened for further challenges.
Such a challenge was mounted in Ohio, where the Supreme Court in
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals Inc.26 relied on a broad
and liberal definition of intent. The Blankenship case is especially notable
in that as in the earlier Johns-Manville case, it concerned workers injured
by exposure to harmful chemicals and allegations of the employer's
fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment of workplace hazards. The
court held that an injury sustained due to an intentional tort was not an
injury in the course of employment. 27 The deliberate exposure of a
worker to dangerous substances in the workplace, especially where the
employer had wilfully violated a health or safety regulation, constituted
an intentional wrong which allowed the worker to pursue a tort action in
the courts. In a subsequent Ohio case, Jones v. VIP Development Co.,28
the Ohio Supreme Court defined an intentional tort as "an act committed
with the intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such
injury is substantially certain to occur".29 The test lies in the second prong
of the definition in the requirement of substantial certainty. The court was
careful to point out that this definition provides a safeguard against the
possibility of a flood of tort actions by requiring more than mere
knowledge and appreciation of a risk by an employer.30
In a 1986 case, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in Beauchamp v. Dow
Chemical Co.,31 adopted the more liberal substantial certainty test and
rejected the difficult to prove intentional tort test. The plaintiff,
Beauchamp, a research chemist had been exposed to "agent orange" and
he claimed that Dow intentionally misrepresented and concealed the
potential danger to his health. The court concluded that the legislature
had not intended to shield employers from liability for intentional torts
and that intentional misconduct would be the type of behaviour the
Legislature would most want to punish.32 Five months after this decision
25. Act of Sept. 10, 1982, ch. 922,; 6(b)(1)-(2), (1982) CaL Legis. Serv. 4944 (West) The
provisions allow for tort actions for intentional employer assaults and fraudulent concealment
of existence of injury and its connection with employment.
26. 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E. 2d 572(1982).
27. Id at 612-613.
28. 15 Ohio St. 3d 90,472 N.E. 2d 1046 (1984).
29. Id at 95.
30. Id.
31. 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W. 2d 882.
32. Id at 14-17; and 895-897.
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the Michigan Legislature amended the Worker's Disability Compensa-
tion Act to codify the intentional tort exception. The amendment has
been criticized as ambiguous33, but recognition of the exception exists.
In conclusion, there is no consensus in the U.S. as to the appropriate
test to determine when liability should be shifted to the employer. There
does appear to be considerable agreement, however, that there are, in
fact, cases when such a shift should occur.
V. The Canadian Experience
This author could find no caselaw in Canada where an employer's
intentionally tortious conduct has been examined in a court. One
explanation for this might be that there are no such unscrupulous
employers in Canada. Unfortunately, there are a small, but vociferous
number of injured workers and workers' dependents who categorically
deny this assumption. While the numbers of such employers will be
small, there is a growing recognition by courts, legislatures and
commentators in the U.S. and by workers and legal clinics in Canada that
such employers do exist and that they benefit from their wrongdoing by
way of the statutory bar. Notorious cases such as the asbestos exposures
by Johns-Manville and the subsequent suppression of information about
health hazards in asbestos industries have been well documented.34
It is not surprising that there are no cases in Canada. Typically, if a
worker wishes to sue his or her employer for an intentional tort the issue
of whether or not such a suit is permissible will be adjudicated by the
provincial worker compensation board itself.35 Given that politics and
economics inevitably play a part in the operation of the boards, factors
other than health and safety are taken into consideration. The limitation
of the scope of the statutory bar is perceived as an economic threat to
employers, especially given the sweeping changes in the law of torts
which has facilitated recovery of tort damages and eroded traditional
common law tort defences. 36
33. See Note, "Michigan Worker's Compensation Act: The Intentional Tort Exception to the
Exclusive Remedy Provision", 23 Valpariso Univ.L.Rev. 371.
34. See Brodeur, P. Outrageous Misconduct The Asbestos Industry on Trial.
35. The following provincial acts make specific provision for the determination of the
availability of civil suits: R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437, s. 11; R.S.M. 1970, c. W200, s.55(4); R.S.O.
1980, c. 539, s.15; R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-13, s. 11(2); R.S.N. 1970, c. 403, s.12(4); O.N.W.T.
1977 (1st) c. 7, s.12(3); See also Smith v. Vancouver General Hospital (1981), 31 B.C.L.R.
358; Workmen's Compensation Board v. CPR and Noelt [1952] 2 SCR 359; Mack Trucks v.
Forget, [1974] SCR 788. Other jurisdictions confer on the various boards the power to
determine all questions of fact and law arising under the acts.
36. See Linden, A., "Public Law and Private Law: The Frontier from the Perspective of a Tort
Lawyer" (1976), 17 Cahiers de droit 831. For a discussion of changes in American tort law
602 The Dalhousie Law Journal
VI. Recognition of the Intentional Tort Exception in Canadian
Jurisdictions
It is the contention of this paper that an intentional tort committed by an
employer should be recognized by courts and explicitly addressed by
legislative amendment in the various provincial worker compensation
acts. While it is not suggested that intentional misconduct by employers
is a frequent occurrence in Canada, it occurs often enough that a small
group of injured workers have become extremely embittered and hostile
to the current systems. Worker compensation critics are among the most
bitterly vociferous of all Canadians, as politicians in all provinces can
attest. Reports of suicides by workers who have despaired of the system
occasionally make the news. Such profound discontent with the system
by these groups is paradoxical in light of the fact that Canadian
compensation benefits and regimes are recognized as being among the
most generous and progressive worker compensation schemes.37
It is notable however, that Canadian provincial legislation does not
provide safety valves by way of punitive or exemplary damage provisions
for workers who have suffered outrageous employer misconduct. As a
result, worker compensation schemes have been interpreted in such a
way that an unscrupulous employer can be consciously indifferent to the
results of an obvious risk and avoid personal liability when an injury will
foreseeably occur. The classic case is the employer's intentional and
fraudulent suppression of information about workplace hazards. The
failure to recognize and deal with the employer's deliberate misconduct
allows the employer or corporation to "cost out" investment decisions
that are likely to result in injury.38 The affront to a worker's health, safety
and dignity when such events take place cannot be underestimated. An
intentional injury changes the fundamental nature of the worker
compensation bargain. The aggrieved worker no longer is interested
merely in compensation, but in some acknowledgement that an injustice
has been done. The victims of deliberate wrongdoing have a real need to
confront the author of their misfortune in order to assert a right and to
take some control of their lives. The injustice which results when this
remedy is denied undermines the integrity of the worker compensation
see Page, "The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's Right
to Sue his Employer in Tort" (1963), 2 BC. Indus. and Com L.Rev. 555.
37. See Bart, and Hunt, Workers' Compensation and Work-Related Illnesses, (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1980).
38. American commentators are increasingly making this point. See generally Comment,
"Exclusive Remedy Provisions in the Workers' Compensation System: Unwarranted
Immunity for Employers' Wilful and Wanton Misconduct (1985), 31 S.D.L. Rev. 157. See
also Amchan, supra note 22 and Hale, supra note 22.
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system overall. Contempt for the unscrupulous employers affects and
harms the vast majority of conscientious and careful employers as well.
The preservation of the employee's common law action against
employers if injury or death results to a worker from the deliberate
intention of an employer has not been made explicit in most provincial
compensation acts. Moreover, in Ontario, the definition of accident
appears to explicitly preclude the availability of an exception for an
intentional tort.39 Nevertheless, in those provinces which have not
explicitly precluded the exception and even in Ontario, it can be argued
that the court should examine the legislation carefully in order to
ascertain the true meaning, purpose and intent of the legislation.
Worker compensation legislation was introduced in Canada and
enacted by the provinces between 1914 and 1950.40 It was enacted, in
part, as a humanitarian response to redress the great difficulty workers
had in achieving compensation for injuries and death suffered in the
workplace. Prior to this legislative reform, a worker who brought an
action against his or her employer was faced with the almost impossible
task of overcoming the harsh common law defences available to
employers; the defences of contributory negligence, voluntary assumption
of risk and the fellow servant doctrine.41 Only a small percentage of
workers recovered under this system and the burden of accidental injury
which was the inevitable result of the industrial revolution fell heavily on
the shoulders of the workers.42 The new legislation provided a more
humane system which attempted to balance the interests of both
employers and their workers by minimizing and equally distributing this
burden. Deliberate employer activity which injures, sickens or kills
workers was never intended to be covered by worker compensation
schemes. Rather, the tort system which operated to the detriment of
workers and which was a potentially expensive and time-consuming
nuisance to employers was to be supplanted by a system which removed
negligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort system.
39. See R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, s.l(1)(a)(i). Accident is defined as a wilful intentional act, not
being the act of the worker.
40. See Ison T., supra note 2, for a complete listing of the Acts and their respective dates at
1.
41. A discussion of the defences can be found in most tort textbooks, see for example,
Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed., (1983). For a discussion of the defences and caselaw in
Ontario see Dee, McCombie, and Newhouse, supra note 2 at 3-5. See also Linden, supra note
36 at 837.
42. For an Ontario example see Risk, "The Law and the Economy in Mid-Nineteenth
Century Ontario: A Perspective", 27 U.T.L.J. 403. Risk provides data for court cases in
Ontario during a period from 1888-1914, p426-430. In the U.S., Prosser in the Handbook of
the Law of Torts, at 526 (4th ed.) stated that from 70% to 94% of workers remained
uncompensated.
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Statutory coverage of negligence is consistent with the underlying policy
of worker compensation to provide compensation recovery for the
inherent, inadvertent risks which are an inevitable side effect of any
industrial system. To suggest otherwise requires a condonation of
deliberate employer misconduct and the negation of the humanitarian
purposes which underlie worker compensation schemes.
From another perspective, worker compensation legislation is public
interest legislation, and should be liberally construed. Therefore, it is hard
to support an interpretation that an intentional tortious injury is a natural
risk which "arises out of and in the course of employment" and which is
comprehended in the statutory bar. The nature of a risk is that it is a
chance of encountering harm; any intentional misconduct makes harm a
substantial certainty. Given that worker compensation is founded on an
insurance principle based on a statistical possibility of risk, it would be
against public policy to insure against an intentional harm.
In addition, one of the goals of worker compensation is to promote a
safe and injury free work environment. To this end, some worker
compensation boards have provisions enabling them to levy financial
penalties above and beyond the normal assessment levels.4 3 While these
penalties have the potential to deter some accidents by ensuring safer
workplaces, they have not been particularly effective. In the first place,
they are infrequently levied. Secondly, when they have been utilized they
have basically been used to improve safety and have ignored health
hazards.44 Moreover, these penalties do nothing for the injured worker
whose compensation benefit is not increased as a result of an intentional
injury. Empowering the injured worker to opt for a civil suit in egregious
cases provides a more effective incentive to employer responsibility.
Accident and injury rates in Canada continue to rise. An American
commentator notes:
It would be nice to think that employers are impelled by humane
motives to consider the health and safety of their employees as the
paramount concern. But the unfortunate truth is that business reacts best
to hopes of profit maximization. Where some employers can avoid more
costly protections for their employees without incurring additional
liability, they usually will do so. Employers generally will act only if given
the monetary incentive to do so.45
43. See Ison, supra note 2 at 144.
44. See Working Paper 53, Workplace Pollution, Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986
at 58; and see Amchan supra note 22 at 686, who notes that the worker compensation
objective for encouraging health and safety has been thwarted because assessment levels do not
reflect the full costs of health and occupational injuries.
45. See Schroeder, supra, note 7 at 895.
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The creation of an exception has already been made in Canadian
jurisdictions with respect to misconduct by a worker. If it can be shown
that a workplace injury resulted from serious and wilful misconduct on
the part of the employee, the worker's claim for benefits may be barred
unless the worker is killed or seriously disabled.46 The rationale for this
provision, as outlined by some provincial boards, is that such intentional
and deliberate misconduct (e.g. horseplay, larking or fighting) does not
arise "out of or in the course of employment". 47 A corresponding
exception applied to the employer for the same reason seems only fair.
VII. Constitutional Challenges to the Statutory Bar
Attempts to create exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule on
constitutional grounds have been unsuccessful. Constitutional challenges
to the statutory bar emerged immediately after the enactment of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Early cases48 argued that
there is a Charter based "right to litigate" and that the exclusive remedy
provision violated section 7 of the Charter. Later cases argued violations
of both section 7 and section 1 5.49 The Piercey case received particular
attention and was very controversial. In Piercey, a Newfoundland widow
whose husband was electrocuted at his workplace, complained that the
exclusive remedy provision was unconstitutional because it deprived the
workers and their dependents of their equality rights guaranteed in
section 15 of the Charter. While Mrs. Piercey's claim failed for timeliness,
Chief Justice Hickman was sympathetic to the argument of a section 15
violation and to the argument that substitution of a tribunal for a court
was contrary to the Charter. In the course of balancing rights under
section 1 he cited jurisdictions which had retained the right of tort action
while still attaining the goals of worker compensation in a legislative
framework. He was concerned that a total restriction on an injured
person's access to court was "an intolerable blot upon the legislative
landscape of a free and democratic nation."' 0
46. See Ison supra note 2 at 41-42 for provincial variations to this exception.
47. See in general Ison, Workers Compensation in Canada, Butterworth & Co. (1983) and see
B.C. Decision No. 194 (1976), 2 W.C.R. 309 and see Ontario WCAT Decision No.337,
August 1986. See also Gilbert, A Guide to Workers' Compensation in Ontario, Canada Law
Book, 1989, at 16.
48. Re Terzian et aL v. Workman's Compensation Board of Ontario (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 144;
Ryan v. Worker Compensation Board(1984), 6 O.A.C. 33.
49. See for example, Budge v. WCB. of Alberta, [1985] 34 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97; revd. [1987]
42 Alta L.R. (2d) 26 (C.A.) and Piercey v. General Bakeries Ltd (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 373,
61 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 147 (I.D.); Reference Re Sections 32 & 34 of the Workers' Compensation
Act (Nfld) (1987), 67 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 16,206 A.P.R. 16, [1988] C.C.L. 3715 (Nfld. C.A.).
50. (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 384.
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The potential implications of this broad proposition were given
nationwide media coverage and resulted in the government of
Newfoundland referring the constitutional questions to the Newfound-
land Court of Appeal. Intervenor status was given to worker
compensation boards, unions and employer groups from across Canada
which thereafter formed a rare coalition of uncomfortable bedmates. The
issue in the Court of Appeal was redefined to determine whether the
removal of the right to sue would create an inequality among groups of
injured persons. The court found no such violation of section 15 of the
Charter. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the court did not
even allow for final arguments and swiftly dispensed with the case in a
single paragraph which stated that the Newfoundland legislation did not,
in the circumstances presented, violate section 15 of the Charter."1 The
Piercey case should not suggest that any challenge, constitutional or
otherwise, which threatens the statutory bar will automatically be
defeated. The recognition of an intentional tort action against an
employer is in no way incongruent with the Piercy decision. An
intentional tort falls outside worker compensation legislation. In fact,
although we have only the bare bone facts in Piercey, it is possible to
speculate that Mrs. Piercey's challenge was the result of her frustration,
anger and deep sense of injustice caused by the circumstances
surrounding the death of her husband. There being no provision for
punitive damages or any precedent for an action in intentional tort, she
chose to challenge the entire worker compensation system.
The integrity and efficiency of the worker compensation systems will
be strengthened and not undermined by the recognition of an intentional
tort exception and/or by provisions allowing punitive damages. These
options, to be triggered when circumstances warrant, will provide a safety
valve to diffuse the legitimate anger and hostility created by the inequity
of shielding unscrupulous employers from the consequences of their
deliberate misconduct.
VIII. Intentional Conduct - a Definition
Difficult questions remain. How should intentional misconduct be
defined? What state of mind is required to constitute intent? Who must
have intentionally caused the injury? Must the consequences have been
intended? When does an employer's behaviour reach the level of
culpability required for an intentional tort? The scope of the intentional
tort excA:ption in workplace injury cases must be clearly delineated and
51. Re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (NFLD.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 923.
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must be placed in a legal context which will be both strict enough to
discourage frivolous and unworthy suits but, liberal enough to ensure that
outrageous deliberate employer misconduct will attract liability. An
American Judge sums up the problem;
"There are definitions of intent in the books more variant than the
manifold uses to which word is put. They range from the statement that
a man is presumed to intend the ordinary and usual consequences of his
acts, to definitions which make intent practically depend upon the
existence of actual malice. In its nature, it is bound to be the existence of
a state of mind, and since that state of mind must be arrived at in proof by
the establishment of facts extraneous to the mind itself, it seems to us that
it is always bound to be a deduction or conclusion from the facts so
established."52
1. Requirements for Liability
(i) What constitutes intentional misconduct?
American courts and commentators have disagreed on the question of the
requirements for an intentional injury. Depending on the political
climate, different requirements have been advocated at various times.
Some commentators and a few courts have taken a very liberal view and
would provide a common law remedy where the employer has acted
with wilful, wanton and reckless disregard of the employee's health and
safety. 3 This approach is premised on the belief that acts of negligence
and wilful torts are different not only in degree, but in kind.54 In
Mandolidis, the court stated that intention can be ascertained from either
verbal or non-verbal conduct, but that in most cases it must be inferred
from a person's conduct. In deciding what constitutes deliberate
misconduct Mandolidis states that the court should focus on the
probability that a given result will follow and on the degree of seriousness
of harm.55 The test arising from Mandolidis is the very loose and broad
"strong probability of harm" test. 6
52. Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933).
53. See Schroeder, supra, note 7. Schroeder advocates that an employee alleging wilful
employer misconduct should be permitted to both institute his or her claim for workers'
compensation and bring suit against the employer. Any tort recovery would be set off against
any worker compensation award to prevent double recovery. See also Mandolidis v. Elkins
Ind, 246 S.E.2d. 907,914.
54. Id. at 896.
55. Id at 759.
56. It should be noted that after the Mandolidis decision the West Virginia legislature expressly
rejected wilful wanton and reckless misconduct as the basis for establishing intentional
misconduct. The legislature feared a flood of litigation would follow and the legislature
amended the Code to require that the employer act with "a consciously, subjectively and
deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death to an employee;
See W.Va. Code 23-4-2(c)(2)(i) (1985).
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At the opposite exteme, a few courts have taken a very narrow view
requiring that the employer truly intend the injury as well as the act.57
This requirement when strictly interpreted is even more stringent than the
criminal standard and virtually ensures that no exceptions for intentional
torts will ever be made.
A middle ground view requires that the employer know with
"substantial certainty" that injury will occur. This approach has been
adopted by the Michigan court in Beauchamp.58 Levin J. held that the
substantial certainty test defines the intentional tort more broadly than
the "true intentional tort" test. He then tracked the wording of the
Restatement of Torts59 and concluded that the employer's conduct would
not be immune from liability if the employer intended the act that caused
the injury and knew that injury was substantially certain to occur from
the act.
60
The "substantial certainty" requirement appears to be the most
promising approach for a Canadian adaptation. It avoids the very loose
and liberal approach of separating recklessness from negligence but it is
more liberal than the narrow emphasis on proof of the defendant's
motivation. The requirement that the employer have knowledge of a
substantial certainty that injury will result appears to achieve the required
balance.
(ii) Who intentionally caused the harm
The question of who must have intentionally caused the injury in order
to hold the employer liable is also an interesting one. Since modern
employers are often corporations or institutional employers, the
requirement that the employer act in person or act to have specifically
authorized the particular act, will render the exception virtually useless.
At the same time, it is unreasonable to hold the employer liable for every
isolated intentional injury inflicted by a co-worker or by a supervisor.
Therefore, it has been suggested that when injuries are the result of
conscious corporate decisionmaking, liability should result.61 Conse-
quently, managerial decisions made by authorized, responsible decision-
makers which result in injuries could be subject to tort action.
57. See Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458. 462 (stating that the intent must be based on a
"deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act). See
also Hildebrant v. Whirlpool Inc., 364 N.W. 2d 394, 396.
58. 427 Mich.1 at 11,398 N.W 2d at 886.
59. Restatement of Torts, 2d & 8.
60. 427 Mich. 1 at 20; 398 N.W. (2d) at 895.
61. See King, J. "The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Remedy Against his Employer," 55
Tenn. L.Rev. 405, 450.
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Additionally, condonation or ratification of decisions taken which affect
the worker would also attract liability.
(iii) What Consequence must have been Intended?
Assuming that a version of the substantial certainty test is preferred, what
result or consequence should the employer have desired or have
knowledge of to a substantial certainty? Does mere knowledge that a risk
exists suffice? Most U.S. courts have required that the intentional
acceptance of a risk is not sufficient to attract liability.62 The Beauchamp
court provided a possible approach. The plaintiff in Beauchamp had been
exposed to Agent Orange in the course of his employment and the court
speculated that if the employer had knowledge to a substantial certainty
of the exposure to such a significant harm, then liability might result.
63
Therefore, a possible rule might require that when the employer has
knowledge to a substantial certainty not merely of a risk, but of a harmful
proximity, exposure etc., then liability may result. To require that the
employer intend the consequences i.e. the harmful result as well as the
act, would make the exception too narrow. A test which falls between
accepting a risk and desiring an injury sufficiently expands the definition
of an intentional injury to make it viable.
In summary, employer conduct can range from intentional and wilful
conduct through to grossly negligent and merely negligent conduct.
Depending on how expansive an exception a court or provincial
legislature wishes to create, the intentional tort could be defined as either
wilful misconduct or intentional misconduct. The wilful misconduct
would arise in the event that an employer is consciously indifferent to the
results of an obvious risk i.e. there is a high probability of injury or death.
The stricter test for intentional misconduct would require the substantial
certainty of harm. With either test severe employer misconduct could be
penalized either by recognition of an intentional tort or by enacting
legislative provisions allowing for punitive or exemplary damages within
the worker compensation scheme.
IX. Conclusion
It is uncertain whether or not the intentional tort exception exists in
Canada. It is the contention of this paper that such an exception should
be recognized. As long as the statutory bar in worker compensation
statutes continues to immunize employers from the results of their
62. For some examples see Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W. 2d. 404, 406-407 (1985); see
also McCormick v. Mark Heard Fuel Co., 183 Ga.App. 488(1987).
63. 427 Mich. 1 at 4.
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deliberate acts, a worker's health and safety is jeopardized in the aim of
achieving cost efficiency. The bargain which was struck in the worker
compensation schemes was to cover negligent not intentional conduct.
Worker compensation legislation sought to balance the rights of worker
and employer in a mutually beneficial manner. While this balance is
maintained in the vast majority of cases, the profound dissatisfaction felt
by a small group of workers who believe they have been deliberately
harmed and therefore unfairly compensated, is casting a pall over the
entire system. Injured workers, advocates and legal aid clinics can attest
to the inequities that exist when employers can inflict injury in the name
of profit maximization.
One solution is for either courts, but preferably for legislatures, to
create and enforce an exception for deliberate employer misconduct. If
intent can be inferred when an employer ignores obvious health and
safety hazards, sanctions should follow by way of an action in intentional
tort. The test for determining when an employer's behaviour has reached
the level of intentional misconduct should be limiting, but not so
restrictive as to make the exception exist in name only. The American
tests of "substantial certainty" and "strong probability of harm" provide
a useful starting point for the construction of a Canadian standard.
Statutory amendments should be enacted to allow workers
deliberately injured by their employers to recover punitive or exemplary
damages and/or to have the right to sue. Such measures would enhance
the image of worker compensation plans, would work to the benefit of
conscientious employers, and would better compensate victims of
deliberate misconduct. A worker compensation system which is
perceived to be fair is less likely to be undermined.
